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Abstract
Most research on Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure development 
focuses on phases prior to construction. The implementation phase itself has received 
less attention. However, sound public–private agreements and project preparations 
can fail during project implementation because of, for example, unforeseen events 
and ineffective responses to them. We conducted case studies on two infrastructure 
projects to examine which management responses to events during implementation 
produce (un)satisfactory outcomes. We found that externally oriented responses or 
a cooperative stance between the public and private partners produce satisfactory 
outcomes in responding to events. In practice, however, management responses are 
often internally oriented and non-cooperative, resulting in unsatisfactory outcomes. 
We identified three explanations for this, related to time pressure in implementation, 
the organization of the involvement of external stakeholders, and project culture 
in the PPP. The article concludes with implications for management and policy of 
infrastructure PPPs.
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Introduction
Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) concern cooperation between governments and 
businesses (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Despite their debatable performance (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007, 2009), PPPs are becoming a prevalent practice (Bovaird, 2004; for 
example, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2012). 
This is also the case for infrastructure development (Brown, 2007; Kwak, Chih, & 
Ibbs, 2009; Little, 2011). For instance, this journal has recently published a range of 
not only scholarly articles on how partnerships can operate effectively but also articles 
that critically discuss the merits and demerits of partnerships (e.g., Leavitt & Morris, 
2007). PPPs are expected to result in efficiency and quality gains, value-for-money, 
reduced pressure on government budgets (Kwak et al., 2009), and less delays and cost 
overruns in project delivery (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; Little, 2011). 
However, these expectations are not always met (Kettl, 2006, in Leavitt & Morris, 
2007). Therefore, Hodge and Greve (2007) argued that “despite their continuing popu-
larity with governments” PPPs have to be studied and assessed “away from the policy 
cheerleaders” (p. 545). This article fits in that line of argumentation.
Acknowledging the conceptual variegation of the PPP concept (Hodge & Greve, 
2013; Klijn, 2010; Weihe, 2008a), we define a PPP as an enduring contractual relation-
ship between two or more partners of which at least one is a public body, in which both 
public and private partners bring some kind of resources (e.g., money, property, 
authority, knowledge) to the partnership, and in which responsibilities and risks (e.g., 
financial, economic, social) are shared for the purpose of delivering public infrastruc-
ture-based products and/or services (cf. Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). There is much 
research on PPPs, but the management of their implementation phase, that is, the 
phase of “infrastructure construction and/or service delivery” (Jones & Noble, 2008, 
p. 109), is a relatively little researched topic (Hueskes, Koppenjan, & Verweij, 2016; 
Jones & Noble, 2008; Mistarihi, Hutchings, & Shacklock, 2013; Weihe, 2008b, 2009). 
Reviews of PPP literature (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Cheung, 2009; Kwak et al., 2009; 
Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010) show that among the main researched issues are the for-
mation of PPPs (e.g., Koppenjan, 2005), procurement, tendering, PPP finance, and 
risk allocation. These are mainly pre-implementation phase issues. As Weihe (2008b), 
among others, found, “what happens after contracts have been signed . . . has received 
[less] scholarly attention” (p. 154). PPP implementation is an important phase, though, 
because sound public–private agreements and project preparations can fail during 
implementation, thus negatively affecting the anticipated benefits of PPPs.
As part of a larger study (Verweij, 2015b), we conducted two case studies on two 
infrastructure projects to examine how PPP project implementation can be effectively 
managed, so that satisfactory outcomes in projects are achieved (Verweij, 2015a; 
Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). Our study focused in particular on management responses 
to “unforeseen events” in “inherently unpredictable worlds” (March, 1994, p. 36). 
These events constitute obstacles for reaching satisfactory outcomes in project imple-
mentation because they challenge predefined agreements and planned preparations 
(cf. Müller-Seitz & Schüßler, 2013; Söderholm, 2008; Van Gils, Gerrits, & Teisman, 
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2009). Public and private managers are confronted with a variety of unforeseen events, 
originating from the dynamic socio-physical context of the PPP project (Mistarihi 
et al., 2013; Söderholm, 2008). Scholars on PPP management argue that literature is 
yet ambiguous about what kinds of management responses produce better outcomes 
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & Van Twist, 2008). The first ques-
tion of this article hence is: how do public and private managers respond to unforeseen 
events during implementation and which management responses produce satisfactory 
outcomes?
We will compare the results of the two case studies of implementing Dutch trans-
portation infrastructure PPP projects—the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein (from here on 
referred to as “A15 MaVa”) and the A2 Maastricht—to answer this question. In these 
two projects, we identified a total of 38 events, with management responses and out-
comes (see Table 1). We analyzed the 38 “event-management-outcome” combinations 
using the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The results indicate six 
different patterns of management responses to events in the two infrastructure proj-
ects. Two patterns are leading to unsatisfactory outcomes, and four patterns produce 
satisfactory outcomes (see Table 1). The patterns are reported in the “Patterns for 
Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes” section.
The second part of the research concerned finding explanations for the patterns. 
The patterns show that “externally oriented responses” to events, that is, responses 
whereby the implementation managers involve the societal environment in dealing 
with the issue at hand, or a cooperative stance between the public and private part-
ners, produce satisfactory outcomes. These findings are in line with previous studies 




the event Identified eventsa Pattern
Nature of the 
response Cooperation
Low Internal Social 9 (A15 MaVa) A





High Internal Public actor 
autonomously
2 (A2 Maastricht) C
High Internal Cooperation 
between 
partners
Physical 1 (A2 Maastricht) D
High Internal Public partner 
intermediates
Physical 1 (A15 MaVa) E
High External Social 9 (A2 Maastricht)
7 (A15 MaVa)
F
Note. A15 MaVa = A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein.
aThe table contains 42 event cases because four event cases of the A15 MaVa project are both in 
configurations A and B.
122 Public Works Management & Policy 22(2)
(e.g., Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006, 2009; Jacobson & Choi, 2008; Mistarihi et al., 2013), 
and with current project management ideas moving away from the traditional “proj-
ect management as closed system” thinking (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof, & In ’t Veld, 
2010; Edelenbos, Klijn, & Kort, 2009). They are in support of previous work, stress-
ing the importance of cooperation and the development of personal relationships 
between partners for the success of partnerships (Heilman & Johnson, 1992, in 
Leavitt & Morris, 2007). Interestingly, however, management responses in the two 
transportation infrastructure PPP project implementations are often still internally 
oriented and non-cooperative, resulting in unsatisfactory outcomes. The second ques-
tion in this article hence is: how can it be explained that unforeseen events are often 
not managed with externally oriented and cooperative strategies thereby producing 
unsatisfactory outcomes? This question is answered in the “Explanations for 
Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes” section.
The next two sections will provide the background of the research. We will intro-
duce the empirical setting of the research in the “Infrastructure PPPs in the Netherlands” 
section. Then, in “The Complexity of PPP Implementation” section, the concepts of 
unforeseen events, management, and (un)satisfactory outcomes are elaborated. After 
explaining the “Data and Method,” the results are presented. The article concludes 
with conclusions and implications for the management and policy of infrastructure 
PPPs in the final “Conclusion and Discussion” section.
Infrastructure PPPs in the Netherlands
PPPs in infrastructure emerge in various shapes and sizes (e.g., Kwak et al., 2009). 
Within the general definition presented above, scholars differentiate between conces-
sion and alliance models (e.g., Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Koppenjan, 2005). In the 
concessional model, there is a hierarchical client–contractor relationship. The private 
contractor is primarily involved in implementation; he designs, finances, and builds a 
public sector project. Responsibilities are divided between the partners and laid down 
in a contract (Leendertse, 2015). There are multiple forms of concessional models, but 
especially the concessional form of the Design, Build, Finance, and Maintain (DBFM) 
contract is promoted in the Netherlands (e.g., Committee PFI, 2008), resembling con-
tracts in the U.K. Private Finance Initiative (PFI; Klijn, Edelenbos, & Hughes, 2007). 
Other concessional forms are, for example, DBFO or DBFMO, where the operation of 
the infrastructure is also included in the contract between the partners (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2004). A recent example of a Dutch DBFM is the A15 MaVa project (see 
below). The number of projects with this form is increasing. However, to date, not 
many of them have been realized (see Committee PFI, 2008; Klijn, 2009; Ministerie 
van Financiën, 2012). In 2012, the Ministry of Finance reported just nine DBFM trans-
portation infrastructure projects that were in the procurement, realization, or exploita-
tion phase.
In contrast to concessional models, alliance models highlight horizontal relation-
ships between public and private partners. Whereas concessions seem to be based on 
the idea of dividing risks between the partners, alliance models pursue the idea of 
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sharing risks. The partners pursue a common goal, and certain responsibilities and 
tasks in implementation are taken on jointly by the project partners. In some alliance 
forms, a new organization is established where the partners share the clientship (e.g., 
a joint venture). However, most forms of alliances have a contractual relationship 
between public and private partners, where the clientship remains with the public part-
ner (Leendertse, 2015). The A2 Maastricht project is an example of this (see below). 
Thus, although both models involve contracts between public and private organiza-
tions and the monitoring of compliance, the alliance model is said to put less emphasis 
on contracts and more on informal cooperation and trust (Edelenbos & Teisman, 
2008). Currently, in line with recent trends toward privatization and “smaller govern-
ments,” the alliance model is less promoted by the Dutch national government than the 
concession model.
Two Infrastructure Projects
The A15 MaVa project has a concessional model with a DBFM contract. It involves the 
extension of the 37-km highway corridor from the Rotterdam port area “Maasvlakte” to 
the “Vaanplein” crossing in the Rotterdam highway ring. Its scope encompasses the 
application of a traffic management system, 85-km highway lanes, a new Botlekbridge, 
and the renovation and reconstruction of civil works (e.g., flyovers, tunnels, and 
bridges) on the corridor. The implementation partners are Rijkswaterstaat and the con-
struction consortium A-Lanes A15, consisting of Strukton, Ballast Nedam, John Laing, 
and Strabag. The DBFM contract was signed in 2010. The construction is to be finished 
in 2015; the maintenance contract will last until 2035.1 The budget is nearly €2,000 
million (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 
Landbouw en Innovatie, & Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 
2012); the construction costs are about €1,400 million (Lenferink, Tillema, & Arts, 
2013). The opportunities for a viable business case are in the financial constructions 
between A-Lanes A15 and its funders and in life cycle optimization, which should gain 
the concessionaire some profits. Contrary to the A2 Maastricht project, the relation 
between A-Lanes A15 and Rijkswaterstaat is purely concessional. A-Lanes A15 is 
responsible for the design, construction, partly financing, and maintenance of the proj-
ect, and the emphasis of Rijkswaterstaat is on monitoring the performance of A-Lanes 
A15 with regard to availability, quality, and stakeholder satisfaction. Based on this, 
A-Lanes A15 receives availability fees that co-finance the project.
The A2 Maastricht project has an alliance-like model. It involves the construction of 
a 2.3-km tunnel underneath the city of Maastricht on the A2 highway corridor, combined 
with real estate development and landscaping, and the rearrangement of adjacent high-
way junctions. Partners are the Dutch highway authority Rijkswaterstaat, the Province of 
Limburg, the Municipalities of Maastricht and Meerssen, and the private consortium 
Avenue2 wherein the companies Strukton and Ballast Nedam participate. The imple-
mentation started with a Design and Construct (D&C) contract, which was concluded in 
2009. The execution is planned to be finished in 2017.2 Rijkswaterstaat sponsors € 564 
million; the other three public partners contribute €144 million, including plots for real 
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estate development (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken, & Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013). The devel-
opment of real estate is expected to cover 10% of the execution costs (about €70 million; 
Lenferink et al., 2013). The private partners have to recoup a substantial part of their 
investments from selling this real estate. Consortium Avenue2 is responsible for the 
design and construction of the project, and the alliance approach is prominently visible 
in that the public and private project organizations are housed in the same building and 
that they run a joint department responsible for the communication with various local 
stakeholders (Projectbureau A2 Maastricht, 2012).
The Complexity of PPP Implementation
Unforeseen Events
Project implementation takes place in dynamic socio-physical contexts in which 
unforeseen events will occur (Gerrits, 2012; Van Gils et al., 2009; see also Müller-Seitz 
& Schüßler, 2013). Unforeseen events often have an impact on implementation 
(Söderholm, 2008). PPP projects are no context-independent “islands” (Engwall, 2003) 
but rather open instead (e.g., Papadopoulos, 2012; cf. Dimitriou, Ward, & Wright, 
2013). Naturally, contingency plans are drafted to deal with dynamical contexts. These 
plans are “repositories of expectations on which managers build their daily activities” 
(Söderholm, 2008, p. 81). They help managers to focus and they guide their actions. By 
the same token, plans also neglect expectations as they cannot foresee all possible 
future eventualities. There are real limits to prediction and planning capacities, no mat-
ter how much information is processed (Gerrits, 2012). Consequently, some events will 
be unforeseen (cf. Söderholm, 2008), which challenges implementation.
The extent to which an event is unforeseen depends on the position of the people 
involved. Events even can be unforeseen by one person and expected by someone else 
(cf. Rescher, 1995). This does not diminish their potential disruptive effect on imple-
mentation, as long as those working in project implementations did not recognize its 
coming. Unforeseen events are non-stochastic and out of reach of contingency plan-
ning, because—contrary to planning for stochastic events in terms of risks—the likeli-
hood of their occurrence is unknown and undetermined.
It is useful to distinguish between two categories of unforeseen events (Van Gils 
et al., 2009). Events can originate from physical sources, like unstable ground condi-
tions. They can also originate from social sources, such as dissatisfied stakeholders 
(e.g., citizens, municipalities, or other governmental organizations) or changing laws 
and regulations. Aaltonen and Sivonen (2009) argued that “stakeholder related con-
flicts and incidents are among the most significant unforeseen risks in projects imple-
mented in challenging environments” (p. 131). During implementation, stakeholders 
are mostly concerned with “the influence of construction activities on their daily rou-
tine activities and life style” (El-Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 2006, p. 596). It may 
be expected that the source of the unforeseen events requires specific managerial 
responses (cf. Allison, 1983; Ring & Perry, 1985).
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Management Responses to Unforeseen Events
Managers often respond to the events by trying to control them, aiming to nullify their 
effect on the implementation process (Van Gils et al., 2009). This response is one type 
we are going to elaborate. Drawing on the PPP management literature (e.g., Edelenbos 
& Klijn, 2009; Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; Klijn et al., 2008), this response is identi-
fied as an internally oriented focus on the project. It is rooted in traditional manage-
ment models focusing on “structure, administrative systems and the execution of 
plans” (Söderholm, 2008, p. 81). The general thrust is on speeding up implementation, 
mainly by explaining and promoting the project interest. The management persists on 
achieving predetermined goals despite unforeseen events. Communication follows a 
DAD strategy (decide, announce, and defend).
Alternatively, an externally oriented response can be followed, emphasizing inter-
action with the societal environment (cf. O’Toole, Meier, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2005). 
This response relates to “process management” approaches (De Bruijn et al., 2010). It 
is characterized by an outward orientation, aiming to create or maintain support for 
project implementation. Possible solutions are sought together with stakeholders. The 
management is receptive toward unforeseen events, and communication takes a DDD 
strategy (dialogue, decide, and deliver). Because of its stakeholder-oriented nature, 
this response can be applied in response to social events (Edelenbos et al., 2009).
Another dimension of the management response concerns the way public and pri-
vate partners are involved in the response. We discern three possibilities. Some events 
are responded to by the public partner; others are responded to by the private partner. 
This depends on how risks and responsibilities are perceived and allocated in the PPP. 
A third option is that the partners develop a joint response (Jones & Noble, 2008; 
Verweij & Gerrits, 2015).
Satisfactory Outcomes
Management responses to events produce outcomes. The most common variables for 
measuring project outcomes are efficiency and value-for-money. These, however, can 
hardly be used in situations wherein projects have not yet been delivered. Nevertheless, 
the quality of the implementation process needs to be assessed. This can be done by 
inquiring whether and to what extent actors are satisfied with the implementation pro-
cess. As suggested by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), this was done by interviewing 
actors and by letting them reflect on the achieved outcomes (cf. Kärnä, Junnonen, 
Manninen, & Julin, 2013; Lehtiranta, Kärnä, Junnonen, & Julin, 2012). These out-
comes can be different things: stakeholder satisfaction, incurred costs, time schedule, 
partner’s behavior, and the perceived quality of mutual relations are the main out-
comes during implementation processes (cf. Atkinson, 1999; Jeffares, Sullivan, & 
Bovaird, 2013; Verweij, 2015c). Which of these indicators is (most) important for a 
manager’s satisfaction depends on the position of the specific manager(s) in the proj-
ect that is/are involved in the event (e.g., a stakeholder manager will be more con-
cerned with stakeholder satisfaction), as well as the specific event at hand (e.g., some 
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events in implementation have no effect on costs or the time schedule). We thus used 
self-reported “managers satisfaction” to assess the quality of the implementation pro-
cess (cf. Dimitriou, 2014; Kärnä et al., 2013; Lehtiranta et al., 2012). We distinguished 
between low and high satisfaction.
Data and Method
Data Collection
The main data come from open qualitative interviews conducted with public and pri-
vate senior project managers and directors. These managers occupy leading manage-
ment positions in the public procurers’ project organizations and the private contractors’ 
project organizations, respectively. Eighteen interviews with 14 respondents were 
conducted for the A2 project from September to December 2011. Twenty interviews 
with 17 respondents were conducted for the A15 project from May 2012 to January 
2013. All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. The transcripts were coded 
for the events, including management responses and satisfaction, as reported by the 
respondents.
Data Analysis
The interviews were cross-compared per identified event. This was facilitated by cod-
ing in ATLASti. This resulted in eighteen “event-management-outcome” combina-
tions for the A2 Maastricht project and twenty for the A15 MaVa project. A qualitative 
reconstruction of each of the 38 events was made.3 Next, the 38 events were compara-
tively analyzed. This allowed us to find (a) patterns across the events for each of the 
two projects, as reported in the “Patterns for Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes” 
section; and to find (b) differences between the two projects, resulting in the explana-
tions that are reported in the “Explanations for Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes” 
section.
The comparative analysis of the events was performed with the method multi-value 
QCA (Cronqvist, 2011; Cronqvist & Berg-Schlosser, 2009), often abbreviated as 
QCA. First, the method analyzes the events as configurations of aspects (i.e., the 
source of the event, the nature of the management response, and the public–private 
cooperation), and then compares configurations that agree on the outcome (i.e., satis-
faction) and differ in just one of the aspects. This was done separately for each of the 
two infrastructure projects. The aspect in which two configurations were different 
could be considered redundant for explaining the outcome. For instance, if two events 
have high satisfaction, and one concerns a social event with an internally oriented 
management response where the private partner acted autonomously, and the other 
also concerns a social event where the private partner acted autonomously but with an 
externally oriented management response, then we infer that the response (internally 
or externally oriented) is not needed for explaining satisfaction: private actors’ autono-
mous responses to social events produce low satisfaction. This comparative process 
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resulted in six patterns (next section), which are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. These 
patterns are explained by comparing the two infrastructure projects with each other 
(subsequent section).
Patterns For Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes
The results of the multi-value QCA’s of the two infrastructure project case studies are 
reported in Table 1 and visualized in Figure 1. We will give two examples of the pat-
terns summarized in Table 1. In one case, the Municipality of Rotterdam (a local stake-
holder) disapproved the construction of the Botlekbridge pillars. A-Lanes A15 
responded by searching for technical solutions to maintain project speed (internal 
response) by itself (private actor acts autonomously). The municipality disapproved 
again, resulting in delays and extra costs. The managers were dissatisfied with these 
costs and delays (low satisfaction). In another case, A-Lanes A15 also responded inter-
nally and autonomously, also resulting in low satisfaction, but this concerned a situa-
tion where the ground conditions nearby an underground pipeline street were worse 
than expected. Because the first case concerned an event from a social source and the 
second case an event from a physical source, the source of the event can be considered 
redundant for explaining satisfaction; both cases thus represent Pattern B in the table 
and figure.4
The table and figure show that there are two patterns associated with low satisfac-
tion (Patterns A and B) and four with high satisfaction (Patterns C, D, E, and F). The 
Figure 1. Visualization of the patterns found in the two studies.
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table also shows that events are more often satisfactorily responded to in the A2 (12 
event cases) than in the A15 project implementation (eight event cases). Furthermore, 
the internally oriented management response is more often applied (in 26 event cases) 
than the externally oriented strategy (16 event cases), and internally oriented responses 
are more often applied in the A15 MaVa project than in the A2 Maastricht project.
Explanations For Achieving (Un)Satisfactory Outcomes
Patterns that complement each other are presented and discussed together (see Table 
1). The first subsection compares Patterns A and F with each other, so as to focus on 
explanations related to the nature of the management response. The second sub-sec-
tion discusses Patterns B to E, focusing on the public–private cooperation.
Internally- and Externally Oriented Management in Responding to 
Social Events
Whereas Pattern F indicates the strong relation between social events, externally ori-
ented management, and higher outcome satisfaction, Pattern A indicates the strong 
relation between internally oriented management of social events and lower satisfac-
tion. The two patterns are opposites, indicating externally oriented management as the 
effective response to social events. This finding corroborates research by, for example, 
Edelenbos and Klijn (2006, 2009), who found that management approaches that 
emphasize openness and interaction with the societal environment result in more sat-
isfactory outcomes than approaches that stress the execution of projects according to 
plans, specified goals, and contractual relations, and that tend to develop a more inter-
nal orientation. The A2 project management responses were more often externally 
oriented than the A15 responses (see Pattern F in Table 1): In nine out of 18 events in 
the A2 project, the management responses were externally oriented, and in the A15 
project, seven out of 20 responses were externally oriented. Our comparison of the 
projects resulted in two explanations.
Explanation 1: Time pressure. The first explanation for this difference between the two 
projects concerns the difference in time pressure experienced. Several managers in the 
A15 experienced time pressure in the implementation. Instead of “being in control,” 
they regularly felt “lived by” the project’s dynamics. The private A15 project director 
talked about impending budget overruns. Under conditions of (perceived) time pres-
sure, engaging in interactive processes with stakeholders (externally oriented manage-
ment responses) feels as time-consuming. Under these conditions, managers aimed for 
quick solutions within their reach (internally oriented). An example is the social event 
“Municipality of Rotterdam does not approve the construction design of the Botlek-
bridge pillars, being unconvinced of the pillars’ strength for carrying the bridge decks.” 
A-Lanes A15’s management response aimed to minimize the effect(s) of this social 
event on the project planning by finding a technical solution to the problem and order-
ing steel for the bridge although the municipality had not yet approved the design 
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(internally oriented response). This response generated financial risks and low satis-
faction. In another event, A-Lanes A15 constructed a temporary road for transporting 
hazardous substances without coordinating the road design (internally oriented) with 
the Port of Rotterdam Authority (another local stakeholder). Later, the Authority dis-
approved the road, which generated low mutual satisfaction.
The A2 Maastricht project provides a contrasting picture. In interviews, the private 
project director showed confidence in the progress toward completion. The inter-
viewed managers exhibited less signs of stress and time pressure. At the same time, 
quite a lot of time was spent in engaging with stakeholders, after a social event 
occurred. For instance, when a local vocational school objected to the phasing of a 
road bypass during construction (social event), an elaborate informal negotiation pro-
cess with the school was started (externally oriented response), resulting in the cancel-
ation of the school’s objection and the maintaining of good rapport between school 
and project organization (high satisfaction). The responses to unforeseen social events 
in the A2 project were often externally oriented. The managers recognized the impor-
tance of stakeholders and invested in the relationships with them. This comparison of 
the two projects indicates that the experience of time pressure reinforces internally 
oriented responses which, in the occurrence of social events, often results in dissatis-
factory outcomes.
The time pressure explanation can also be found in the literature. Owens, Ahn, 
Shane, Strong, and Gransberg (2012) found that tight timelines for project delivery 
add to the complexity of the project. When managers experience time pressure, they 
draw boundaries in attempts to reduce the complexity of implementation. Information 
is filtered and ignored (Edland & Svenson, 1993), which allows managers to “ration 
attention” (March, 1994) so as to get (back) “in control.” This simplification is inher-
ent to coping with unforeseen events (Gerrits, 2012; Van Gils et al., 2009). When time 
pressure increases, focused approaches aiming to get control over implementation 
become attractive. However, when the societal environment is excluded in responding 
to an unforeseen event, stakeholders’ interests and influence can be overlooked, result-
ing in opposition to the project implementation later on. If so, the internally oriented 
management response is actually becoming ineffective.
Explanation 2: Organization of stakeholder involvement. A second explanation for more 
externally oriented responses in the A2 project concerns the organization of stake-
holder involvement. This can be explained from the different project scopes. The A2 
is about local inner-city infrastructure development. It benefits the citizens of Maas-
tricht regarding traffic safety, environmental quality, and traffic congestion. Local 
actors such as the municipalities, citizens, and businesses were facing not only the 
negative externalities during implementation (e.g., noise nuisance and limited acces-
sibility during construction) but also the possibilities of prospective revenues, for 
example, more safety and environmental quality, and less traffic congestion. The 
project was not only about connecting point A to point B; it was about regaining city 
qualities. This seemed to be crucial. It also meant that the local Municipality of Maas-
tricht was partner in the PPP, and that the municipality was committed to involving 
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local stakeholders in planning, procurement, and implementation. Local stakeholder 
platforms and citizens had a say in deciding on which project bid would win, and 
during implementation, stakeholders were actively informed about and involved in 
the project.
In contrast, the A15 MaVa project is not intended nor presented as regional devel-
opment. It is “just” an improved connection between points A and B. This created no 
support among local stakeholders. This also tended to reinforce internally oriented 
approaches in which stakeholders are external to the project. Nearby residents and 
municipalities experienced negative externalities during implementation, with less 
positive effects in the future compared with the A2 project. In addition to this, the 
applied concession model created an indirect relation between the private manage-
ment and the stakeholders. Stakeholders do have implementation agreements, but with 
the procurer Rijkswaterstaat. These agreements were included in the contract between 
Rijkswaterstaat and A-Lanes A15. Rijkswaterstaat assumed that they had transferred 
their relationships with stakeholders to A-Lanes A15, who was responsible for imple-
mentation. The indirect relationships meant that, inter alia, local municipal authorities 
were at arm’s length of the implementation. They were not able to translate stake-
holder issues into the project. The issues only found a way out through external events. 
After citizens complained (to their own municipality) about noise nuisance, the 
municipality forced A-Lanes A15 to stop pile driving works. In the A2 project, it 
seemed that internalizing local stakeholder interests into the partnership allowed for 
proactive and attuned joint actions.
This comparison suggests that in projects with a broader scope of transportation 
and urban development, where multiple stakeholders are involved in implementation, 
stakeholder interests are better served, creating also satisfactory outcomes for the 
implementation managers themselves. The effectiveness of stakeholder involvement 
can also be found in the literature, where it is emphasized that involvement is impor-
tant because actors who’s interests are harmed can easily block or hinder implementa-
tion (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Whereas that literature 
implies that less unforeseen social events may occur when stakeholders are effectively 
involved, recent research (Verweij, Klijn, Edelenbos, & Van Buuren, 2013) addition-
ally shows that stakeholder involvement combined with an externally oriented man-
agement results in satisfactory outcomes.
Public–Private Cooperation in Responding to Events
Table 1 and Figure 1 show four patterns that indicate some form of public–private 
cooperation in response to events: Patterns B, C, D, and E. Pattern B states that inter-
nally oriented responses by a private partner result in low satisfaction. Patterns C, D, 
and E, however, indicate that internally oriented management can result in high satis-
faction; satisfaction requires that the public partner is also involved in responding to 
the event.5 Public actors can compensate a private internal orientation. These findings 
indicate that joint public–private actions in response to unforeseen events result in 
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higher satisfaction. Joint action may mitigate the internally oriented response of one of 
the partners (cf. Jacobson & Choi, 2008; Mistarihi et al., 2013).
Explanation 3: Project culture in the PPP. The two infrastructure projects show a quite 
different relationship between the public and private partners. In the A2, signing the 
contract was perceived as the start of actually working together. In the A15, signing the 
contract was perceived as the moment of transferring responsibilities and risks from 
the public to the private partner. The public actor was only prepared to play a partner-
ship role as intermediary between A-Lanes A15 and stakeholders in the environment 
(Pattern E in Table 1), and only after the tension between project and stakeholders got 
high (Verweij, 2015a). In both projects, the public partner Rijkswaterstaat followed a 
businesslike, formal approach. This was reflected in Rijkswaterstaat’s role perception 
in the PPPs, which mainly concerned contract monitoring and project control. The dif-
ference is that in the A2 project, however, the managers from the municipality applied 
another approach and were able to compensate the Rijkswaterstaat way of working. 
These managers were much more socio-politically orientated and not only focused on 
contract monitoring and project control. The A2 project director had a long-standing 
career as manager and director of urban development projects in Maastricht, and the 
project’s stakeholder manager was in close contact with the Maastricht alderman. The 
municipal managers brought to the partnership local ways of working, characterized 
by open and informal relationships with private partners. The cooperation of local 
(municipal) and national (Rijkswaterstaat) public managers created a project culture 
with a unique and joint set of norms, values, and principles tending toward partner-
ship. According to respondents, the open and informal PPP culture in the A2 project 
was also instigated by the proximity of the public and private management: they were 
housed in the same building. Whereas the informal relationship and the proximity 
were regularly stated in the A2 Maastricht interviews as success factors for implemen-
tation, in the A15 MaVa interviews, in contrast, the businesslike (formal), tense, and 
remote nature of the relationship was stressed (see also KING, 2009).
This partnership culture explanation is also found in the PPP literature, often by 
reference to the two PPP models that underlie projects. The PPP model can condition 
the project culture that is allowed to emerge. Scholars argue that the concessional 
model (found in the A15 project) “is not a real partnership because co-production is 
limited, risk-sharing is absent, and relationships are purely contractual” (Weihe, 
2008b, p. 157). The argument is that the strict demarcation between public and private 
actors, anchored in contracts, discourages cooperation. So, the advantages of not blur-
ring different value systems (Jacobs, 1992) by which public and private sector actors 
are governed (cf. Ring & Perry, 1985) can easily become a hindrance for stakeholder 
involvement and externally oriented approaches. In the alliance model, the demarca-
tion between the partners is less strict, not only generating fears about the possibility 
of corruption by some but also facilitating satisfactory cooperation in implementation. 
Governments are more intensively involved, taking care of public interests after 
unforeseen events emerge (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008).
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Conclusion and Discussion
Conclusion
How do public and private managers respond to unforeseen events in implementation? 
Which management responses produce more or less satisfactory outcomes? Moreover, 
what can explain these patterns? These were the questions we set out to answer in the 
introduction of this article. Based on our study, we can draw four conclusions.
•• Externally oriented management responses to social events result in satisfaction.
•• Internally oriented management responses to social events do not result in 
satisfaction.
•• Managers, however, often apply internally oriented and autonomy-seeking 
responses to events.
•• Internally oriented management responses can also result in satisfaction, but 
this requires a public partner to be involved, acting as an intermediary between 
the project management and its environment. This insight emphasizes the 
importance of cooperative management in PPP implementation.
By subsequently comparing the two projects, we found three explanations for the 
patterns we identified.
•• A combination of local and national management cultures in the A2 Maastricht 
project resulted in a unique externally oriented and cooperative PPP approach, 
different from the normal way of working of Rijkswaterstaat. Such a combina-
tion of cultures was absent in the A15 project. Cooperation was restricted there 
by the concessional DBFM contract. Consequently, cooperative action only 
happened reactively at moments when tensions were already high, resulting in 
an implementation that is experienced as stressful.
•• The experience of time pressure. A characteristic of PPP implementation, that 
is, the project construction and delivery, is the increasing time pressure. After 
contracting, when the project “starts rolling,” time is experienced as more pres-
surized. This pressure is felt by managers, who react by seeking to make their 
project reality less complex. This explains their inclination toward internally 
oriented and autonomy-seeking responses (see further the previous section).
•• Although excluding local stakeholders from the implementation scheme seems 
attractive in advance because it seems to simplify implementation, in practice, 
however, this may generate a project-inward orientation and (hence) unforeseen 
social events. Internalizing local stakeholders as partners in the partnership 
seems to pay off.
Discussion
The patterns and explanations for achieving satisfactory outcomes in PPP project 
implementation are based on two case studies from the Netherlands. Although more 
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comparative research is needed to further corroborate the conclusions, our research 
points to several implications for PPP project implementation.
Because events mostly have social sources and because they are best responded to 
with externally oriented management responses and public–private cooperation, allo-
cating sufficient resources (e.g., time, attention, money, personnel) to stakeholder 
management, and to managing the PPP itself, is important (El-Gohary et al., 2006; 
Jones & Noble, 2008; Mistarihi et al., 2013) in avoiding bigger problems and greater 
costs later on. The importance of these aspects is easily overlooked or underestimated. 
Staying in control of planning and budget during PPP project implementation requires 
managers’ full attention. Keeping the project “under control” is strived for through 
different monitoring mechanisms deployed by public principals. Although these 
mechanisms are indisputably important—inter alia for safeguarding public values as 
quality, accountability, and transparency (Reynaers, 2014), and the prevention of 
ambiguous relationships between the partners—the danger in implementation is that 
monitoring becomes the sole focus. Consequently, stakeholders and their interests and 
influence on the project may be missed (Dimitriou et al., 2013). The clear division of 
tasks, risks, roles, and responsibilities is stressed, but our study shows that investment 
in cooperation, and the closer involvement of local stakeholders (such as municipali-
ties) in the partnership, so as to achieve mutual satisfactory results, is, however, equally 
important (see also Leavitt & Morris, 2007).
It would be worthwhile researching flexible contract structures. Our interviewees 
suggested that the integrated area development approach of the A2 Maastricht project 
generated fewer stress-sensitive incentives. It also allowed a higher level of flexibility 
because the profits are in the development of real estate, and private contractor 
Avenue2 was given some degree of flexibility in planning the exact construction of the 
real estate, that is, to build real estate when there is a favorable market for it. Perhaps 
incorporating such characteristics in concessional PPP models can create more flexi-
bility in project implementation.
Public agencies are increasingly looking to DBFM for the delivery of public 
works and services (e.g., Rijkswaterstaat, 2011). We understand the attractiveness of 
the concessional model. It promises the advantages of partnership and simultane-
ously the separation of the public and private domains to prevent a lack of transpar-
ency. We understand and support these values. At the same time, our research 
suggests that there are other PPP models than DBFM that are more prone to exter-
nally oriented management and public–private cooperation, resulting in more satis-
factory outcomes during implementation. The alliance model seems more flexible in 
the sense that it facilitates externally oriented management and public–private coop-
eration. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the more contractual and non-
cooperative approach that characterized the concessional model in project 
implementation also explains poor project performance (in terms of, for example, 
quality, cost overruns, and time delays) at the delivery of the full project. More 
research is needed for this. However, our broader message here is that policy-makers 
may do well tempering their enthusiasm for DBFM a bit and to take a critical atti-
tude toward it (cf. Hodge & Greve, 2007), or to at least bear in mind that the 
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concessional DBFM model is not the only way to advance in infrastructure project 
realization. Other PPP formats may have certain advantages over DBFM.
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Notes
1. See http://www.verbredinga15.nl/public/A15/hetproject/Paginas/Mijlpalen.aspx (last 
accessed 2015-12-04).
2. See http://www.a2maastricht.nl/nl/plan/onderdelen-.aspx (last accessed 2016-10-02).
3. Triangulation with data sources such as project–internal management documents was not 
possible as these sources were not made available, but additional site visits and examina-
tion of public project documents and websites were used to check and corroborate the 
interview data when possible.
4. An empty cell in the table means that the aspect is “unnecessary” for explaining the 
outcome. For instance, the empty cell in the column “source of the event” of Pattern B 
indicates that the pattern “internally oriented management and a private actor responding 
autonomously” is associated with low satisfaction, irrespective of the event’s source. This 
can also be observed in Figure 1, where 15 events are not designated having either a social 
or a physical source (Patterns B and C).
5. Note that Pattern C could be considered an “odd one out” as these events did not actually 
concern project implementation events, but pre-contract events. This can be explained by 
the particular planning process of the A2 Maastricht project, where procurement and public 
planning were intertwined (see Van Valkenburg & Nagelkerke, 2006). Given our defini-
tion of project implementation (see “Introduction” section), because the Public–Private 
Partnership (PPP) contract was closed before public planning procedures were finalized, 
the two events were included in the analysis.
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